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The idea of demythologizing proposed by the Marburg New Testament 
scholar, Professor Rudolf Bultmann, has become d increasing importance 
in theological discussion since the end of the second world war. Based on 
Biblical studies more than on later tradition, it poses a major alternative 
to the "Church Dogmatics" of Karl Barth.1 Bultmann was associated with 
Barth in the early development of dialectical theology. However, his major 
work has been in Biblical studies rather than the history of doctrine. The 
particular term "demythologizing" did not appear in his writings until 
1941, although it had long been implicit in his exegesi~.~ Bultmann did 
not follow Barth as the latter moved away from an earlier "existential" 
position, significantly influenced by Kierkegaard, to a more objective 
interpretation based on the ideas d Augustine and Anselm as well as 
Luther and Calvin. Bultrnann, to Barth's dismay, centered his attention on 
historical and epistemological questions which seemed to have been 
rendered unimportant by Barth's strong confessionalism. 
Bultmannys demythologizing arose from creative as well as critical Bibli- 
cal scholarship, not from any desire to reduce the scope of theological 
inquiry. He differed from most confessional theologians by conceding that 
exegesis inevitably has philosophical presuppositions. Demythologizing is 
a mode of radical reconstruction, which arises from recognition that 
modern scientific man simply cannot accept the traditional natural-super- 
natural designation. It rejects initially any literal or fundamentalist inter- 
pretation d the psychology and cosmology of the Bible. Bultmann believes 
that both are so outmoded as to be irrelevant for modem scientific man. 
The three-story view d the universe with heaven above, earth in the 
center and hell beneath, is not essential to the Christian message. Bult- 
mann's theories would not have evoked major debate if he had stopped at 
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this point. Instead, he proceeded to emphasize that earIy Christianity had 
borrowed significantly from late Jewish apocalyptic and Gnosticism in its 
description of the work of the S a ~ i o u r . ~  The "myth" of the descent of the 
God-man, for example, was not in the original preaching of Jesus. 
Bultmann like most contemporary theologians does not use the term 
"myth" simply negatively to mean an untrue fable. Rather, it is a vehicle 
for conveying religious meaning appropriate to its time. From his New 
Testament research, Bultmann concluded not only that the Gospels reflect 
growing theological interpretation; demythologizing has its beginning even 
in the Biblical material itself. For example, with respect to eschatology- 
last judgment and resurrection-we can observe a changing attitude from 
the synoptics, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, to Paul and John.4 Development 
is away from the early literal form of expectation of the kingdom of God 
to the realized eschatology of the Fourth Gospel. Bultmann has pushed 
the search for evidence in historical questions to the limits of knowledge. 
On first appearance, his position bears the guise of a return to an earlier 
modernism that belonged to Enlightenment rationalism more than to 
Christian orthodoxy. Yet his intent is not simply one of criticism but of 
reconstruction. It is this latter concern that has made him a center of 
controversy in contemporary religious discussion. 
I 
In his re-interpretation, Bultmann has been significantly influenced by 
the philosophy of Martin Heidegger whom he came to know personally 
while both were teaching at M a r b ~ r g . ~  Heidegger's phenomenology enabled 
the New Testament scholar to identify abiding existential relations, which 
remained after mythical modes of expression had been discarded. It is 
this "existential meaning," expressed religiously in eschatology more than 
in metaphysical statement, which distinguishes Bultmann from the earlier 
modernists. He believes that in Jesus of Nazareth God confronts man 
uniquely. The truth of this confrontation cannot be established simply 
historically, as an "external fact," but must be known as an "event" within 
man's inner lie. Historical investigation alone can never supply religious 
meaning. Kierkegaard's dictum is relevant: "truth is subjectivity." De- 
mythologizing has the intent of returning to what is primary in terms 
of existence. 
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger's major work published in 1927, he under- 
took a basic analysis of the human situation which he regarded as necessary 
prolegomenon to authentic philosophical ~tatement.~ Most traditional meta- 
physics, he believed, had ignored the question of man himself. Apart from 
an adequate phenomenology of human existence, all ideas of Being were 
necessarily incomplete if not mistaken. Heidegger attempted a critical 
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description of Dasein, existence in the world, insisting that death is the 
final limit of our horizon of knowledge. Man finds himself "thrown" into 
the world; his existence is inescapably time-bound and finite. Not only 
did Bultmann accept Heidegger's description of man as one who' is destined 
for death; he regarded it as a discerning appraisal of the human condition 
apart from redemption. He adopted as well Heidegger's criticism of tradi- 
tional philosophical expression. 
Heidegger's thought about the philosophia perennis is not of a piece. 
It is important to distinguish between his earlier and later  period^.^ 
Following the publication of Sein und Zeit, his orientation shifted from 
concern about Dasein, existence in the world, to a new interest in Being. 
Heidegger's basic conviction is that philosophy has come to reflect the 
limitation of the present situation in culture in general. The question of 
Being is no longer relevant to contemporary discussion, in part because it 
has been misstated. Being has been made an object-Thought, the Abso- 
lute Idea, or God. I t  is none of these. Heidegger's judgment of the 
philosophia perennis is more negative than that d Jaspers. He proposes 
the destruction (Destruktion not ZerstGrung), that is, the dismantling of 
metaphysics as it has been practiced from Plato to  Hegel.* Heidegger's 
choice of terms supports his own special viewpoint. He does not argue 
that philosophical reflection has been useless, but only that it has run its 
course in the Western tradition. 
Ott identifies three interrelated stages in Heidegger's later development: 
a turning from nothing to Being, the overcoming d metaphysics, and the 
"step  backward^."^ The last is Heidegger's own phrase. Sein und Zeit 
was completed in only two of its originally intended three sections. Hei- 
degger wrote in explanation of the unfinished part: "The section in question 
was held back because thinking failed in adequate articulation and did not 
achieve its goal by the language of metaphysics."1° For Heidegger, the 
overcoming of metaphysics by a "step backwards" has meant a study of 
the history of concepts, even of their sounds; they are to be understood 
as historic rather than in general as universals. It has also brought an 
interest in poetry, notably, the writings of Holderlin and Rilke. What the 
critical philosopher and metaphysician a u l d  not say was made explicit 
in the word of the poet, whom Heidegger calls the prophet of Being. 
In Unterwegs zur Spmche, Heidegger gives the following explanation 
of the change in his interpretation: "I have forsaken an earlier position, 
not to exchange it for another, but because even the former position was 
only a pause on the way. What lasts in thinking is the way."ll Heidegger 
has made it clear that he did not wish to reconstitute the earlier type of 
metaphysics, which he designates as cconto-theo-logical." This type of 
philosophin perennis arises out of the effort of Dasein to ground itself. 
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It is based on the assumption that all beings are ultimately grounded in 
some supreme Being, itself an uncaused cause. It has led to an investigation 
of beings in the light of their being, but has not faced the problem of Being 
itself. Heidegger believes that his new understanding of the history of 
Western thought has laid bare its foundations and in the end undermined it. 
The last possible form, the thingliest of things, appeared in Hegel's 
Absolute Spirit. Hegel, according to Heidegger, is the only occidental 
thinker who experienced the history of thought by thinking it.12 With him 
the metaphysical tradition of the West came to its "Vollendung in der 
Neuzeit." Standing at the end of this development, Heidegger claims new 
and deeper insight. What Hegel did not understand is that Being, in 
revealing itself, dissimulates itself. In absorbing everything that is and 
can be, even temporality, into his system, he achieved the ultimate sub- 
jective "Weltbild." There remained only one way for subjectivism to go, 
namely, toward the denial of system in the affirmation of ncm-absolute 
subjective will. Nietzsche conceived the destruction d metaphysics by 
understanding its outermost possibility. Yet, he did not realize the full 
implication of his discovery. He was still bound to an onto-theo-logical 
mold, whose ultimate object he denied in his atheism. For Heidegger, Being 
and world are not two different things. Being is its revelation. 
Heidegger describes Being as event, an unveiling or revealing.13 Stand- 
ing in its light means something else than having a point of view or a 
system of concepts. In particular, he criticizes the way in which thought 
is now judged from its correlation with logical rules. Heidegger wishes to 
go behind correspondence of idea with what is present to the disclosure 
of Being. As Being discloses itself to man, it constantly brings itself forward 
into openness. This coming forward is not an act of man but of Being, 
Our proper response is to let it be the way it is in itself. We are its 
guardians or shepherds. Heidegger's explanation is intended as a criticism 
of the traditional identification of thought with Being. Too often, philoso- 
phers have regarded Being as a penetrable essence. I t  is not only revealed; 
it is also veiled even in its illumination. Heidegger means to emphasize 
that it is historical and not just static; its essence is in its happening. 
Heidegger's description of our response to the call of Being is clarified, 
in part, by his analysis d the Pre-Socratics.14 Assuredly, this part of his 
interpretation is among his most original and creative work. Heidegger 
refuses to view the Pre-Socratics through the eyes of their successors, 
particularly Aristotle. They are not to be understood simply as precursors 
of Plato or Aristotle, but as making a more basic contribution in their 
own terms. For them, Heidegger argues, Being did not lie beyond the sum 
total of physical things. Rather, they regarded all as one in the primordial 
"presence of what was present." Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides 
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all conceived of Being as Anwesen, unveiledness. They did not think in 
terms of "one" or the "good," thought of thought or actus purus. In short, 
they did not regard Being as lying beyond the sum total of physical things. 
Rather, all was one in the primordial "presence of what was present." It 
was Plato and Aristotle who mistakenly conceived of the "presence of the 
present" as idea or energeia. (The root of energeia is the "thought of 
thought.") Such an outlook began the wandering in the forgottenness of 
~eing,  under the domination of interest in beings rather than Being. Plato 
and Aristotle were mistaken in relating the idea of Being to transcendence, 
when it is primarily a question of existence in the world. 
The brilliance of Heidegger's re-evaluation of Greek thought must be 
acknowledged, whether or not one agrees with him. Karl Lowith has 
been outspoken in asserting that Heidegger has re-written history to fit 
his own claims about Being. Whatever judgment historians may pass on 
the details of his exposition, Heidegger's dominant conviction stands out 
clearly: philosophers from Plat01 to Hegel have looked for an idea or thing 
beyond the world. They have confused "Sein" and "Seiende," seeing 
Being among beings.15 The resultant onto-theo-logical metaphysics has 
inevitably bred confusion. Since the time of Plato, the image-copy pattern 
has led to misunderstanding of both freedom and history. Concern for a 
realm of being beyond the world was intensified by the religious convic- 
tions of Platoys and Aristotle7s successors in the medieval period. Inevitably, 
the inacceptability of such a view led to the forgottenness of Being in 
modernity. 
Heidegger believes that the only way to overcome nihilism is to pass 
beyond the question of God or its negation. Philosophy, he argues, cannot 
say whether God is or is not; the question is not relevant to its situation 
and data. Yet we can know Being, with its favor, revealing itself to us. For 
Heidegger, the rediscovery of Being depends on the meaningful use of 
language. Truth is not exhausted by static definition; rather it is an 
"unveiling." Being brings itself into openness in a situation of encounter. 
Although Heidegger's attempt to speak of authentic existence easily passes 
over into religious language, he does not mean to accept traditional theistic 
categories. This is clear, for example, in his attempt to link Being and the 
holy without accepting the Christian idea of God. 
I1 
Jaspers' appraisal of the Hebrew-Christian tradition has been a more 
open one. However, his exchanges about demythologizing with Bultmann 
were broken off without recognition of their larger common interests.16 
Jaspers more than Heidegger was prepared to speak of transcendence, 
whose meaning is to be read from the ccciphers," the symbols of ultimate 
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meaning. His evaluation of Christian orthodoxy is given at length in one 
of his later books, Der Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offen- 
barung.17 Jaspers does not believe that it is possible to identify universally 
valid religious meanings. If God had spoken in an Incarnation, as orthodox 
Christianity teaches, history and freedom would be at an end. Christianity 
is identified with doctrine and sacrament. Yet Jaspers made the classical 
themes of Biblical religion an intimate part of his philosophy. 
Jaspers joins a deep personal appreciation for the Hebrew-Christian 
religious heritage with what he calls philosophical faith. He describes three 
levels of meaning: Dasein or existence in the world, freedom, and trans- 
cendence. These are to be seen in interrelation, but one is not reducible to 
the other. The philosophia perennis, in Jaspers' usage, designates basic 
concerns about the self, value, and transcendence that have appeared in 
the philosophical tradition. Jaspers believes that it remains the necessary 
goal of all authentic philosophical inquiry, although it has never been 
achieved fully. In short, there are common probIems even when different 
language is used. Jaspers' continuing interest in the philosophia: perennis is 
made explicit in his study of pivotal thinkers of both the Eastern and 
Western traditions entitled The Great Philos~phers.~~ Buddha, Confucius, 
and Jesus are included with PIato, Spinoza, and Kant. Prophecy, mysticism, 
and metaphysics are not separated from each other absolutely. Instead, 
philosophy for Jaspers has a wider scope than pure reason alone. Strongly 
influenced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, he is skeptical of any single 
ontology and wishes to remain always open to new experience. Philosophy 
does not provide a finished set of answers in advancs of man's free choice. 
Jaspers, like Heidegger, believes that it demands a looking within man 
himseIf. Yet, his reconstruction is not as radical as that proposed by 
Heidegger or Bultmann. 
Jaspers' inclusive perspective, which in part parallels Heidegger's idea 
of Being, is what he calls the "all-encompassingv-das Urngreifende.lg 
He believes that Being is more than the subject-object dualism in which 
we experience it. Things appear in a particular space-time context. Yet, 
we ourselves and others are not simply objects in the world. Unlike 
Heidegger, Jaspers does not believe that an incisive this-worldly definition 
of Dasein is possible. Instead, he proposes to relativize the world in a way 
that Heidegger does not. Dasein must be understood in relation to freedom, 
that is moral freedom, and freedom in relation to transcendence. 
Jaspers agrees with the later Heidegger's renunciation of any Promethean 
direction of metaphysics in which the cosmos or even deity is established 
from the inner life d man. Yet even in this "existential" openness to Being, 
Jaspers continues in the tradition of the philosophia perennis. He wishes 
to participate critically in meanings shared by philosophical reflection ever 
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since its earliest self-knowledge, not to bring it to an eschatological end as 
~eidegger wishes to do. We have no perspective on Being which will allow 
us to stand outside of the tradition or philosophical faith, as he calls it.20 
The philosopher's task is one of reliving past decisions, not of abandoning 
their insight. Freedom and meaning are together. Jaspers like Heidegger 
is emphatic that reason is not autonomous and cannot be made its own 
ground and end. Finally, the ciphers, the meaning of transcendence must 
be read individually by every man in his freedom. More than with Heideg- 
ger, freedom leads to moral decision in the spirit of the practical reason 
of Kant. 
I11 
Heidegger and Jaspers both draw on traditions in which philosophy and 
theology have been In dialectic with each other for centuries. Heidegger's 
phenomenology has its sources in religious as well as secular thinkers: 
Scotus, Luther, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey and Husserl. Bultmann 
found it a penetrating rejection of Enlightenment anthropology as well as 
any notion of self-redemption. Jaspers, by contrast, retained a larger em- 
phasis on moral autonomy in his philosophical faith. Heidegger's under- 
standing of man's situation as threatened by death seemed an appropriate 
prolegomenon to theology. His claim that Dasein cannot transcend to a 
ground outside itself opened the way for faith. In the end, no religious 
answer is possible from the point of view of immanence alone. The question 
raised by Heidegger's later works is whether this really follows. His inter- 
pretation of Being now appears to be a more inclusive and positive one 
than Bultmann allowed. It is our thesis that Heidegger's growing interest 
in Being not only has brought him into more direct confrontation with the 
philosophia perennis; it has increased the range of reappraisal called for 
by his ideas. The followers of Barth have looked favorably on Heidegger's 
later works, whereas Bultmann's school has preferred the earlier Heidegger. 
Fundamental issues remain which neither group of theologians has treated 
comprehensively. 
Traditional theistic descripiioa, drawing more inclusively on the philoso- 
phia perennis, has recognized the subtlety and complexity of the problem 
of Being. Bultmann did not misjudge the fact that Heidegger's new phe- 
nomenology required reappraisal of the problem of religious knowledge. 
His demythologizing, like Heidegger's dismantling of metaphysics, is a 
creative attempt to establish a new perspective for evaluation of the essen- 
tial truth of the past; in the case of Christianity, this is the kerygma. Yet 
Bultmann's existential, post-Kantian orientation does not appropriate the 
full resources of present philosophical re-appraisal. Not only does he pro- 
pose to relativize earlier world views, in particular the two-story, natural- 
supernatural version of the universe. He regards modern science as essen- 
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t i d y  non-mythical in its outlooks and perspe~tives.'~ The presuppositions 
of its world view remain almost totally unquestioned. Heidegger, like 
Jaspers, is much less favorably disposed to the modern ethos and regards 
it as leading to the forgetting of Being. They believe that it can give neither 
an inclusive view of reality nor any abiding meaning. Seeking both, 
Heidegger has turned instead to poetic symbol. While raising the problem 
of Being anew, he denies any metaphysical idea of God. The traditional 
questions of monotheism, the unity of God, transcendence, and theodicy 
cannot be treated legitimately within the bounds of his phenomenology. 
Heidegger has developed his own religious category of immanence in 
his study of the Pre-So~ratics.~"arly Greek religion understood .that 
earth, sky, gods, and mortals were together in an original unity. Men dwell 
on earth and wander under the sky, sojourning in the proximity of the 
divinities. Heidegger separates the question of Being and the holy fronl 
that of the One. The mortals who have the capacity for death as death 
are to spare the earth, receive the sky, and expect the gods. In the end, 
Heidegger's treatment of Greek religion may turn out to be more of a 
personal commentary than a historical exposition. Mircea Eliade, in his 
Cosmos and History, develops a theory of archetypes." Ritual and myth, 
sacred space and sacred time, he argues convincingly, re-enact the heavenly 
activity of the gods following the archetypes. His whole analysis, based on 
extensive historical studies, suggests a dualism more akin to Platonism 
than to Heidegger's naturalistic view of religion. 
It is important to consider how much Heidegger's interpretation has its 
background in the ideas of Nietzsche.'"'God is dead," wrote Nietzsche, 
prophetically proclaiming that the nineteenth-century union of culture and 
religion was broken. Heidegger proposes reconstruction which goes beyond 
the nihilism Nietzsche foresaw. Philosophy ought not to dream of a time- 
less realm of Being. Its concern should rather be this-worldly. Can the 
theist allow this latter premise as much as Heidegger supposes? Heidegger, 
like Nietzsche, rejects idealistic metaphysics and any vital religious experi- 
ence of transcendence. The issue is not whether nineteenth-century ideal- 
ism, at times a surrogate for religion, can be resurrected. It is whether 
existence in the world can be understood apart from transcendence. 
Heidegger refuses the resources of the philosoplzia perennis which assign 
ultimate meaning and mystery to the Being of God. May not the philo- 
sophical experience be more open to transcendence as Jaspers suggests? 
Jaspers' position is a more inclusive one, concerned with "Dasein, 
Existenz, and Tran~cendenz."~"~ be sure, he takes Nietzsche's warning 
against system seriously; no singIe worId view is valid for all time. In the 
end, however, he does not accept Nietzsche's rejection of traditional cate- 
gories and perspectives in the thoroughgoing manner of Heidegger. Funda- 
DEMYTHOLOGIZING AND PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS 63 
mental questions and modes of approach are perennial. Walter Kaufmann 
has pointed out that Jaspers moved increasingly away from Nietzsche's 
in later In fact, reports Kaufmann, he never really 
accepted Nietzsche's position in principle. For Jaspers, philosophy and 
are together in the philosophia perenrzis. He accepts Nietzsche's 
dictum that Western man's intensity for truth would have been impossible 
Christianity. Jaspers' devaluation of the nihilistic implications of 
~ietzsche's thought arises from his appreciation for the Jesus of history as 
well as from his philosophical faith. Skepticism concerning the Jesus of 
history has led a number of contemporary Protestant theologians, in the 
tradition of Bultmann, to embrace a situational ethic. Jaspers, by contrast, 
the abiding significance of Jesus' ethic." He grounds his 
acceptance of it in philosophical as well as religious commitment. Finally, 
the problem of the meaning of Jesus' teaching cannot be separated fully from 
the question of whether there are categories of interpretation which are not 
simply epochal. In spite of an Enlightenment anthropology, Jaspers calls 
attention to perennial insights of the Christian tradition. 
Heidegger's exposition, however difficult of understanding, has a host 
of explicit points of reference to the philosophia perennis. No doubt, he 
has given modem philosophical inquiry a new and fresh context by raising 
the question of Being. In the end, however, he offers not metaphysics but 
a phenomenology of immanence. Bultmann, borrowing from Heidegger, 
has broken new ground and avoided the traditional Lutheran dismissal of 
all philosophical prolegomena as "Law" rather than "Grace." Our question 
is whether philosophy, if allowed a place in discussion d demythologizing, 
ought not to be appropriated in its fullest range of insights. Is the experi- 
ence of Being as epochal as Nietzsche and Heidegger suppose? Nu doubt, 
"Sein" and "Seiende" have often been confused in theistic statement. Yet, 
one may still wonder whether the whole of Western philosophy has been 
as mistaken about Being as Heidegger suggests. 
Langan has pointed out that the key to Heidegger's view of Being is 
his intention to be post-Kantian, post-Hegelian, and post-Nietzs~hean.~~ 
Heidegger concluded, from his study of Kant, that no objective, categori- 
cal, or causal analysis can lead to the discovery of metaphysical principles 
which have abiding validity. Only projections, viewpoints, horizons, or 
epochs remain. Heidegger takes from Hegel the notion that history is the 
self-extension of its source of unity, unfolding ecstatically as freedom. He 
does not raise the possibility that history might have less relative signifi- 
cance. Are there points of reference by which present ideas should be 
judged, to avoid distorting the past arbitrarily? Finally, by orienting his 
interpretation of Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead, he was saved 
from the idealistic absolutism of Hegel and enabled to1 place the source of 
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Hegel's view of history within the horizon of Daseiiz. Having so structured 
his thought, Heidegger at the same time proposes to appropriate all that 
is possible from the metaphysical eras, placing it within his radically finite 
context, devoid of any reference to transcendence. Langan criticizes 
Heidegger further for lack of specificity about the "presence of the 
present." As in the case of Bultmann, the world of nature, like the tran- 
scendent eternity of God, tends to dissolve into a single horizon of personal 
temporality. 
Set in their larger context, the ideas of both Bultmann and Heidegger 
are highly suggestive for the continuing dialectic between philosophy and 
theology. Seen only in their negative, destructive implications, they easily 
become sectarian positions. Discussion of their positive contribution has 
led to reappraisal of the analogy of being, an issue which we cannot treat 
at length here. Arnold B. Come, in an essay in The Later Heidegger and 
Theology, reports a modification of Barth's earlier intransigence against 
the analogia entis.29 By 1950, Hans Urs von Balthasar had convinced 
Barth that the Protestant's analogia relationis, like Aquinas' uizalogia entis, 
is in fact a form of the analogy of proportionality. Robinson, in the same 
series of essays, recounts that Heidegger himself espoused an analogy 
doctrine at the 1960 meeting of the Old M a r b ~ r g e r s . ~ ~  He asks whether 
Heidegger's interpretation of Being does not make it possible to avoid the 
pitfalls which Barth found earlier in the analogia entis: thought seeks 
control over the existence of God and describes only a static relation, 
Robinson finds that Barth's objection to the analogy of being was 
directed against a particular Roman Catholic formulation, in particular, 
that of the Jesuit, Erich Przywara. Whether Przywara ever understood the 
nnalogia erztis in the way Barth supposed is highly dubious. Przywara did 
not limit the idea to one particular formulation but regarded it as repre- 
sentative of all types of Roman Catholic theology, Augustinian, Scotist, 
Molinist and Thorn i s t i~ .~~  He insisted that the relation of philosophy and 
theology be conceived in the broadest possibIe terms. Przywara argued for 
authentic but not exhaustive intellectual knowledge of Being. If Being is 
acknowledged to be analogical in character, the philosophia perennis is at 
least open to theism; Przywara insisted that it is implicitly theistic. Is 
Heidegger's dismantling of philosophy to be explained in part from his 
rejection of the aizalogia entis? 
This possibility deserves careful attention in any theological appropiia- 
tion of Heidegger's later thought. The nizalogia entis is a characteristicaIIy 
Platonic-Augustinian as well as an Aristotelian-Thomistic theme.3z 
Whether a philosophical or theological reference or both, it expands and 
structures phenomenology. Heidegger's charge that Plato and Aristotle 
began the wandering in thc forgottenncss of Bcing bears directly on his 
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of theism. Bultmann seems to have considered analogy only 
briefly, not distinguishing it sufficiently from myth.33 Attempts to revise 
his position while still accepting the questions he has raised, make clear 
that this reference cannot be avoided. For example, Schubert Ogden has 
to supplement Bultmann's theories by reference to process 
in particular the ideas of Whitehead and Charles H a r t ~ h o r n e . ~ ~  
Important as this may be, it is hardly possible unless there is some re- 
evaluation of Platonism. Whitehead treated Plato's thought more pcsi- 
tively than Heidegger in his remark that all Western philosophy is a foot- 
note to Plato's ideas. 
Heidegger has not been able to avoid symbolic language any more than 
Plate; he has only restricted it to temporal modes of "immanence." It is 
clear that Heidegger and Jaspers have made a singularly important contri- 
bution to re-evaluation of the philosophia: perennis by calling attention to 
the fact that "Sein" need not be interpreted as "Denken." They have shown 
that an assumed correlation between the two has often obscured existential 
realities. Yet it was Hegel, not Plato or Aristotle, who attempted to bring 
this correlation to its fullness. Rapprochement with the philosophia 
perennis must consider that analogy is not simply a "rationalist" principle; 
in its classic Greek and Christian expression, it relates essence and exist- 
ence (without identifying them except in God's transcendent Being). 
Although Christian particularism drastically modified Greek intellectual- 
ism, it remains indebted to Plato and Aristotle for the idea of analogy. 
Augustine's theology represents the classic synthesis of Christian faith 
and the philosophia perennis. Taken as a whole and not just from his 
Anti-Pelagian writings, it provides a comprehensive reference for wnsid- 
eration of the themes raised by Heidegger and Jaspers. In the Reformation, 
Protestantism drew primarily on Augustine's later works. Especially since 
Kant, it has attempted to avoid the idea of Being. Bultmann's demytholo- 
gizing brings the possibility of re-evaluation of this position. Exegesis can 
no longer proceed from a self-contained doctrine of Scripture, in view of 
the findings of higher criticism. Demythologizing has encouraged a much 
needed revival of interest in epistemology as well as the history of ideas. 
It is our thesis that re-evaluation cannot take place in this direction without 
reference-implicit or explicit-to the philosophia perennis. Bultmam's 
acknowledgment of the relevance of philosophy as a prolegomenon to 
theology may in the end require Protestant thought to speak more directly 
to questions of Being. 
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